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TRANSFORMING RHETORIC INTO REALITY: 
A FEDERAL REMEDY FOR NEGLIGENT BROKERAGE ADVICE 
BARBARA BLACK∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Nearly everyone wishing to invest in the securities markets must use the 
services of brokerage firms out of necessity.  Even investors who select their own 
investments require brokerage services to execute their transactions.  Other investors 
place greater reliance on their brokers and look to them to provide investment 
advice.  Many brokerage houses, particularly large full-service firms, distinguish their 
services from discount brokers by encouraging customers to rely on their advice.  
Such companies advertise heavily to promote both their investment acumen and 
their attention to customers’ needs.1  Because incompetent or careless brokers can 
cause tremendous harm to their customers’ financial well-being, often with grave 
implications for their retirement security, customers who are encouraged to rely on 
information provided by their brokers are entitled to expect that brokers will 
perform these services competently and carefully.     
The principal participants in the regulation of the brokerage industry agree 
that broker competence and care are central to the federal regulatory system.  When 
Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“SEA”), it recognized2 that 
public confidence in the U.S. capital markets depends on competent and careful 
                                                 
∗ Professor of Law and Director, Corporate Law Center, University of Cincinnati College of Law.  My 
deepest appreciation goes to Jill I. Gross and Margaret V. Sachs for their insightful comments on 
earlier drafts of this article.  
1 See Barbara Black, Brokers and Advisers – What’s in a Name?, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 31, 32 
(2005); PACE INVESTOR RIGHTS PROJECT, ADVERTISING STUDY (2004) (unpublished, on file with 
author).  
2 As expressed by a Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) who was a 
staff attorney in its Enforcement Division for many years, “[I]t is clear that, in enacting the securities 
laws, Congress intended to raise the standards of conduct of those playing important roles in the 
securities markets . . . .”  Manuel F. Cohen & Joel J. Rabin, Broker-Dealer Selling Practice Standards: The 
Importance of Administrative Adjudication in Their Development, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 691, 694 
(1964). 
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securities salespersons.3  Moreover, the need for professionalism in the selling of 
securities is a consistent theme in subsequent amendments to the SEA: in 1964,4 
Congress strengthened qualification standards for broker-dealers;5 in 1975, it adopted 
major reforms to the self-regulatory system to better “police the conduct and 
strengthen the professional standards of professional participants in [the United 
States] securities markets;”6 in 1990, it added provisions to curb brokers’ sales 
practices in penny stocks, a segment of the market particularly rife with abuses.7  The 
U.S. Supreme Court has frequently stated that one of the purposes of the federal 
securities laws is achieving “a high standard of business ethics in the securities 
                                                 
3 The brokerage firm’s salespersons are technically “associated persons” as defined in Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(18), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(18) (2006).  However, they are more colloquially 
referred to as brokers. 
4 In 1961, Congress directed the SEC to conduct a study and report on the adequacy  of the rules of 
the Self-Regulatory Organizations (“SROs”) for the protection of investors, including disciplinary 
rules for conduct inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade.  See Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 § 19(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d) (2006).  The SEC’s final product, the Special Study of the 
Securities Markets, led to the 1964 amendments to the SEA that subjected non-exchange broker-
dealers to additional regulation: all broker-dealers in the over-the-counter markets (“OTC”) would be 
subject to standards of “training, experience, competence, and such other qualifications as the 
Commission finds necessary.”  Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(b)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(7) 
(2006).  Broker-dealers that were regulated only by the SEC (“SECO”) would be subject to SEC rules 
designed “to promote just and equitable principles of trade.”  Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 
15A(b)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6) (2006).  In 1983, Congress required all OTC broker-dealers to 
belong to a national securities association, thus eliminating SECO broker-dealers.  Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(b)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8) (2006). 
5 The House of Representatives observed “a dramatic increase in public participation in the securities 
markets, particularly among persons having but slight acquaintance with the intricacies of corporate 
finance and stock market operations.  This development demands that the selling of securities be 
conducted in a more professional manner . . . .”  H.R. REP. NO. 1778, at 3 (1962), reprinted in 2 
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1933-1982, at 1759, 1761 (1983). 
6 H. R. REP. NO.  94-123, at 44 (1975), reprinted in 3 FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY 1933-1982, at 2471, 2514 (1983).  Specifically, the rules of national securities exchanges, the 
SEC (with respect to SECO broker-dealers), and national securities associations were required to 
promote “just and equitable principles of trade,” Securities  Exchange Act of 1934 § 6(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78f(b)(5) (2006);   Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15A(b)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6) (2006); see  
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(b)(9), and standards with respect to “training, experience, and 
competence.”  Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 6(c)(3)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(c)(3)(A) (2006); 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(b)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(7) (2006); Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 § 15A(g)(3)(A) & (B), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(g)(3)(A) & (B) (2006). 
7 See generally Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 
101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (1990) (regulating the penny stock market). 
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industry.”8  The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), in turn, identified 
competence and care as important components of ethical conduct through its 
development of the “shingle theory,” which holds brokerage firms to an implied 
representation that they will deal fairly and competently with their customers.9  The 
principal Self-Regulatory Organizations (“SROs”)10 charged with the front-line 
responsibility of regulating the brokerage industry, the National Association of 
Securities Dealers (“NASD”) and the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”), have 
enacted rules that include standards of competence and emphasize “commercial 
honor” and “just and equitable principles of trade”11 for the protection of investors.  
In short, they all would agree with the statement, made over forty years ago, that 
“[n]o amount of disclosure . . . can be effective to protect investors unless the 
securities are sold by a salesman who understands and appreciates both the nature of 
the securities he sells and his responsibilities to the investor to whom he sells.”12     
Unfortunately, these views are largely rhetoric.  In reality, many customers 
are victims of negligent treatment by their brokers.  The SEC reports that it receives 
more complaints about broker-dealers than any other type of entity,13 and customers 
who file arbitration claims against their brokers14 classify a significant number of 
                                                 
8 Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (quoting SEC v. Capital 
Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)); see SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002); 
United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 775 (1979).    
9 See, e.g., Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1969); Kahn v. SEC, 297 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1961). 
10 “Self-regulatory organization” is defined at Securities Exchange Act of 1934  § 3(a)(26), 15 U.S.C. § 
78c(a)(26) (2006). 
11 NYSE CONST. art. I, § 2(a) (2003); NASD BY-LAWS  art. XI, § 1 (2006), available at 
http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/display/display.html?rbid=1189&element_id=1159000026. 
12 See H.R. Doc. No. 95, pt. 1, at 588 (1963).  The omitted language refers to a prospectus, but the 
point is the same with respect to trading transactions.  
13 Cynthia A. Glassman, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, A View from Inside the SEC: Remarks 
at the Financial Service Institute’s 2006 Broker-Dealer Conference (Jan. 25, 2006), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch012506cag.htm [hereinafter Glassman]. 
14 In Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987), the Supreme Court permitted 
arbitration of SEA claims pursuant to arbitration clauses in customers’ agreements with their brokers.  
Id. at 238.  Since this holding, virtually all disputes between individual investors and their brokers go 
to arbitration before NASD or NYSE arbitration forums. 
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these claims as negligence.15  As just one example of widespread negligence resulting 
in customers’ losses, in 2004, fifteen firms settled with the SEC and NASD for their 
salespersons’ failure to obtain discounts on mutual fund fees that customers were 
entitled to because of the amount of their purchases.16   
A fundamental deficiency in the current federal regulatory system, as 
interpreted by the federal courts, is that customers have no federal remedy for 
injuries caused by the investment advice of incompetent and careless salespersons.  
The lofty language of Congress and the Supreme Court17 masks the reality that, since 
1933, Congress has been stingy in creating private remedies for investors18 and that 
in recent years, the Supreme Court has taken a narrow view of investors’ remedies, 
doubting their deterrence value and expressing concern about their costs.19  Section 
12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 (“SA”)20 is the only express private damages 
remedy for negligent advice; however, in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.,21 the Supreme Court 
held that this provision did not apply to trading transactions.22  In Ernst & Ernst v. 
                                                 
15 These statistics are available at 
http://www.nasd.com/ArbitrationMediation/NASDDisputeResolution/statistics/index.htm. 
16 Glassman, supra note 13. 
17 The Supreme Court uses the aspirational language set forth supra in the text accompanying note 8 
only when the government is enforcing the federal securities laws, not when private parties seek to 
enforce them. 
18 Congress has added only one explicit remedy since the original enactments of the SA and SEA, in 
the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1988.  See Thomas W. Joo, Legislation and Legitimation: Congress and 
Insider Trading in the 1980s, EXPRESSO PREPRINT SERIES, Working Paper 941, Feb. 8, 2006, available at 
http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/941 (analyzing why Congress devoted so much attention to 
increasing the penalties for insider trading).    In 1990, Congress amended Securities Exchange Act of 
1934  § 29(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) to allow purchasers of penny stocks to rescind purchases made in 
violation of the cold-calling rules.  See infra note 114 and accompanying text.  In 2002, as part of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress extended the statute of limitations for Rule 10b-5 claims.  See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1658(b) (2006). 
19 The best example is Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1977), where the Court 
asserted that Rule 10b-5 litigation poses a greater danger of vexatiousness than other types of 
litigation.  Id. at 741. 
20 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (2006). 
21 513 U.S. 561 (1995). 
22 Id. at 582. 
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Hochfelder,23 the Court limited the implied remedy under SEA section 10(b) 24 and 
Rule 10b-525 to exclude negligence actions.26  While the Supreme Court held that SA 
sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3)27 apply to negligent advice in trading transactions,28 the 
federal courts of appeal currently assume that the Court would not recognize an 
implied cause of action under this provision.29  Similarly, federal courts do not 
recognize the SEC’s shingle theory outside of SEC enforcement actions30 and have 
refused to imply private causes of action for breach of NYSE and NASD rules.31  
                                                 
23 425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
24 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
25 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006). 
26 Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 214. 
27 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) & (3) (2006). 
28 In Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980), the Supreme Court held that SA sections 17(a)(2) and 
17(a)(3) do not require scienter.  Id. at 702.  In United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1979), the 
Supreme Court held that SA section 17(a) applies to “ordinary market trading.”  Id. at 778. 
29 See, e.g., Maldonado v. Dominguez, 137 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1998), discussed infra notes 105-108 and 
accompanying text.  But see AFA Private Equity Fund 1 v. Miresco Inv. Servs., No. 02-74650, 2005 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22071, at *14-15 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2005) (following Sixth Circuit precedent to 
the contrary).  
30 See Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596 (2d Cir. 1969); Roebuck v. Guttman, 678 F. Supp. 68, 69 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988); Vernon J. Rockler & Co. v. Graphic Enters., Inc., 52 F.R.D. 335, 342 n. 12 (D. 
Minn. 1971); see also Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Shingle Theory Dead?, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1271, 
1296-97 (1995) (concluding that private plaintiffs cannot recover damages under the shingle theory). 
31 Since the Supreme Court’s retrenchment from implying causes of action, appellate courts are 
instead focusing on legislative intent and finding it lacking.  See, e.g., Spicer v. Chicago Bd. of Options 
Exchs., 977 F.2d. 255, 266 (7th Cir. 1992) (declining to announce a categorical rule, but looking to 
legislative intent to find no implied cause of action under the CBOE trading rules); Jablon v. Dean 
Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 679-81 (9th Cir. 1980).  Previously, courts had been more favorably 
disposed to imply a cause of action in some circumstances, although they expressed reluctance to 
impose liability for negligence.  See, e.g., Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 
F.2d 135, 143 (7th Cir. 1969) (noting that plaintiffs alleged fraud); Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & 
Co., 358 F.2d 178, 182 (2d Cir. 1966).  In contrast, commentators at that time generally supported 
imposing liability on brokers for negligent violations of those SRO rules intended to protect investors 
(as opposed to “housekeeping rules”).  See, e.g., Lewis D. Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities Based upon Stock 
Exchange Rules, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 12, 30 (1966); Lewis D. Lowenfels, Private Enforcement in the Over-the-
Counter Securities Markets: Implied Liabilities Based on NASD Rules, 51 CORNELL L. Q. 633, 643 (1966); 
Nicholas Wolfson & Thomas A. Russo, The Stock Exchange Member: Liability for Violation of Stock 
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Some federal courts have even said that brokers owe no duty of care to their 
customers.32  
What accounts for this discrepancy between rhetoric and reality?  The late 
Professor Louis Loss, who was present at the creation of the federal securities laws, 
thought it “almost inconceivable” that Congress failed to provide a remedy for the 
vast majority of investors who purchase securities in trading transactions.33  Many 
commentators agree with Professor Loss and cogently argue that the Supreme Court 
simply got it wrong in Gustafson.34  An equally plausible explanation, however, is that 
Congress made a deliberate policy decision that SEC and SRO regulation would 
adequately protect investors from incompetent and careless brokers; this viewpoint is 
supported by consistent Congressional action to strengthen the responsibilities and 
authority of the SROs35 and to add private remedies only for more egregious forms 
of broker misconduct.36  More cynically, Congressional failure to provide investors 
with a private damages remedy for negligent advice may reflect the securities 
industry’s extensive lobbying efforts and political clout.37 
Whatever the explanation, the reality for many customers who are victims of 
their broker’s negligence is that their losses may go uncompensated.  In the absence 
of a federal remedy, customers are forced to fashion a remedy from state law 
                                                                                                                                     
Exchange Rules, 58 CAL. L. REV. 1120, 1141-42 (1970).  But see Philip J. Hoblin, Jr., A Stock Broker’s 
Implied Liability to its Customer for Violation of a Rule of a Registered Stock Exchange, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 
253, 272 (1970) (arguing that “protection of investors” means protection of the general public and not 
the individual investor, “who very often profits from and participates in the rule violation”).     
32 See, e.g, Richardson Greenshields Secs., Inc. v. Lau, 693 F. Supp. 1445, 1457 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) 
(stating that since there is no duty of care for securities brokers, there certainly is not one for 
commodities brokers). 
33 Louis Loss, The Assault on Securities Act Section 12(2), 105 HARV. L. REV. 908, 916 (1992).  
34  See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Securities Act Section 12(2) After the Gustafson Debacle, 50 BUS. LAW. 
1231, 1251 (1995); Ted J. Fiflis, Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc.: Judicial vs. Legislative Power, 23 SEC. REG. 
L. J. 423 (1996); Peter V. Letsou, The Scope of Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933: A Legal and 
Economic Analysis, 45 EMORY L.J. 95 (1996).  
35 See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.  
36 See supra note 18.  
37 For a former SEC Chairman’s description of the powerful interest groups in the securities industry, 
see ARTHUR LEVITT, TAKE ON THE STREET: WHAT WALL STREET AND CORPORATE AMERICA 
DON’T WANT YOU TO KNOW, WHAT YOU CAN DO TO FIGHT BACK 236-239 (2002). 
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principles cobbled together primarily from tort and agency law.  State law, however, 
provides inadequate protection for customers for two reasons.  First, the choice of 
state law can result in significantly different treatment of substantially similar 
conduct.38   Second, as explained in Part I of this Article, while tort and agency law 
provide a sound basis for imposing liability on negligent brokers, state courts 
generally have been reluctant to do so and instead take a narrow view of the duty the 
broker owes to his customer.39  Thus, reliance on state law is anomalous with the 
important federal principle of the centrality of broker competence and care to well 
operating national capital markets.  
This Article argues that Congress should amend the SEA to establish federal 
standards of care and competence and to allow customers to sue for damages when 
these standards are violated.  Part I explains why state law remedies provide 
inadequate protection for investors.  Part II sets forth the proposed federal 
standards.  Part III considers, as an alternative to congressional enactment, 
promulgation of these standards by the SEC and explores possible ways that 
investors could use them as a basis for damages claims.  Part IV assesses the policy 
objections made by the Supreme Court and other federal courts to expanding private 
damages remedies for investors.  This Article argues that such objections are 
inapplicable or unconvincing in the customer-broker setting, particularly since 
virtually all of these claims will be resolved through SRO arbitration.  Part V explains 
why adoption of these legal standards is important as SRO arbitration moves away 
from its origins as an equitable forum toward a quasi-judicial system where investors’ 
claims may need to be more firmly grounded in legal principles.  For these reasons, 
this Article concludes that Congress should adopt federal standards of competence 
and care and provide an express remedy for broker negligence. 
I.  THE NECESSITY FOR A FEDERAL REMEDY:  THE INADEQUACY OF STATE 
LAW PROTECTION 
This Section discusses some common forms of broker negligence that harm 
investors.  Although broker negligence theories may overlap, for the sake of 
convenience, Section A divides them into three categories: negligent misstatements, 
negligent conduct, and negligent failure to speak.  Section B sets forth basic tort and 
                                                 
38  See, e.g., Williams v. Deutsche Bank Secs., Inc., No. 04 Civ. 7588, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12121, at 
*18-19 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2005) (noting that California law offers greater protection to customers 
than New York law).   
39 See, e.g., De Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 306 F.3d 1293, 1307-08 (2d Cir. 2002) (discussing 
the limited scope of the broker’s legal duties to customers).   
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agency law principles, as well as established industry standards, and demonstrates 
that together these principles support imposing liability on brokers in all three 
situations.  Despite this, state courts have been reluctant to impose negligence-based 
liability on brokers.  Although this judicial reluctance is unwarranted, it is pervasive 
and longstanding, as is illustrated in Section C.  Thus, the best solution is to amend 
the SEA to establish federal standards of competence and care and to provide an 
express federal remedy. 
A. Broker Negligence 
To some degree, all investors are vulnerable to harm from their brokers’ 
negligence.  Even investors who make their own investment decisions rely on their 
brokers to execute orders in accordance with their instructions, to obtain the best 
available prices and not to enter into unauthorized transactions.  Investors expect 
their brokers to perform these services competently and can suffer financial harm if 
the brokers’ conduct is negligent. 
Many investors expect more from their brokers and rely on them to provide 
sound investment advice.  In turn, many brokers are eager to provide advice and 
solicit customers by promoting the quality of their advice.  Accordingly, this Article 
focuses in particular on the harm brokers can cause through negligent advice.  The 
degree of customers’ reliance can vary.  Customers may seek occasional advice about 
which securities to purchase and expect that their brokers will be diligent in 
obtaining the information, will have the requisite expertise to assess the information, 
and will exercise care in communicating the information to them.40   Instead, brokers 
may communicate inaccurate or incomplete information about an investment 
product or strategy to customers because they were careless in obtaining the correct 
information, they lacked sufficient expertise to understand the information, or they 
were careless in communicating the information accurately.  As a result, customers 
may make investment choices they otherwise would not have made and may suffer 
financial harm because of their brokers’ negligent misrepresentation. 
Other customers’ reliance on their brokers’ advice may be a longstanding and 
integral aspect of their relationship; the customer may never make an investment 
decision without consulting with, and indeed without the recommendation of, the 
broker.  In these relationships, the customer expects that the broker will only 
recommend investment products or strategies that are suitable for the customer’s 
financial needs.  In egregious cases, the unsuitable recommendation is the result of 
the broker’s fraud.  More frequently, however, it is the product of the broker’s lack 
                                                 
40  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. e (1977).   
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of diligence resulting from failure to ascertain and understand the customer’s 
financial situation and objectives, failure to research and comprehend the 
recommended investment product or strategy, or failure to communicate the 
recommendation to the customer with sufficient care so that the customer 
understands the potential benefits and risks of the investment.  If the broker’s 
recommendations are unsuitable, the customer may experience serious financial 
harm.  Although unsuitable recommendations may also be considered a type of 
misrepresentation, this Article treats them as a form of conduct because of the 
specialized nature of the claim, the importance of the broker’s actions in 
investigating the recommendation, and the frequency of these claims. 
Finally, other investors seek greater assistance from their brokers; they expect 
their brokers to construct and manage suitable investment portfolios for them, 
including recommending alterations to their portfolios based on changing 
conditions.  Customers who look to brokers to serve as their financial advisers may 
expect their brokers to provide them with information, and, if brokers fail to do so, 
they may suffer financial loss.  Customers have frequently made two complaints.  
First, after the broker persuades the customer to buy an investment product 
(typically, stock in a start-up company with growth potential), the broker does not 
provide the customer with any updated information about the investment, so that 
the customer is caught unawares when its market price drops.  Second, if the 
customer instructs the broker to purchase an investment product or pursue an 
investment strategy that involves greater risk than is suitable for the customer, the 
broker does not warn the customer that, in the broker’s professional opinion, the 
investment is too risky for the customer.  Customers may expect that, because of the 
nature of that relationship, brokers have a duty to provide their customers with 
information in these two instances. 
B. Basic Tort and Agency Law Principles 
Negligent Misrepresentations.  Leading torts commentators state that common 
law liability for negligent misrepresentations exists in commercial relationships where 
the resulting injury is pecuniary.41  According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts,  
[o]ne who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, 
or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, 
supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business 
                                                 
41 Judicial concerns about the potentially broad scope of liability, as expressed in Ultramares Corp. v. 
Touche, 255 N.Y. 170 (1931), are not present in the customer-broker situation.   
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transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them 
by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to 
exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or 
communicating the information.42   
In the words of one leading treatise, “there would seem to be very little justification 
for not extending liability to all parties and agents to a bargaining transaction for 
making misrepresentations negligently.”43    
Negligent Conduct.  Common law agency and tort principles hold agents 
responsible for harm caused to their principals by their failure to live up to industry 
standards of care and competence.  Under the Restatement (Second) of Agency, an 
agent owes a duty to the principal to act with the standard of care recognized within 
the industry, unless the agreement provides otherwise. 44  Similarly, the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts requires individuals to exercise the degree of care and skill 
“normally possessed by members of that profession or trade in good standing in 
similar communities.”45  Failure to live up to industry standards is a basis for liability, 
unless the parties agreed that the standards were not part of their contract.  In 
addition, under the Restatement (Second) of Agency, the agent has a duty “to use 
reasonable efforts to give his principal information which is relevant to affairs 
entrusted to him and which, as the agent has notice, the principal would desire to 
                                                 
42 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (1971); see, e.g., Maliner v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., No. 
04-60237-CIV-ALTONAGA/Bandstra, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5985, at *26 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2005) 
(allowing plaintiff’s negligent misrepresentation claim against portfolio manager).  Professor Dobbs’ 
criticism that section 552 is over-inclusive does not apply to broker-customer relationships, since he is 
concerned about imposing liability on adversary bargainers who do not undertake to exercise 
reasonable care.  See 2 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 472 at 1352-53 (2001) [hereinafter 2 
DOBBS].  
43 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 745 (5th ed. 1984). 
44 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379(1) (1958); see Index Futures Group, Inc. v. Ross, 557 
N.E.2d 344, 347 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990) (explaining that negligence claims can be based on breach of 
industry regulations).  
45 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965). 
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have.”46  Courts, for example, consistently impose liability on real estate brokers in 
negligence for failure to live up to industry standards. 47  
Industry Standards of Care and Competence.  SRO rules and other recognized 
industry standards set forth standards of care and competence applicable to brokers.  
With respect to negligent misrepresentations, SRO rules generally require that when 
communicating information about an investment product or strategy to a customer, 
the broker must exercise care to ensure that the information is correct and that the 
broker conveys it accurately to the customer.48  When the broker recommends an 
investment product or strategy to the customer, the broker’s responsibilities, and 
what constitutes reasonable care, are spelled out in more detail.49  SRO rules make 
clear that brokers must have sufficient information about their customers’ financial 
situation, including their current holdings and investment objectives,50 as well as 
sufficient information about the recommended investment product or strategy,51 so 
that their recommendations are suitable for their customers (the “suitability 
obligation”).52 
Although there are no specific SRO rules addressing the broker’s duty to 
update and duty to warn, industry standards recognize both duties.  The Content 
Outline for the General Securities Registered Representative Examination (Test 
Series 7),53 the qualification examination for general securities registered 
                                                 
46 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381 (1958). 
47 See, e.g., Saiz v. Horn, 668 N.W.2d 332, 337 (S.D. 2003); Menzel v. Morse, 362 N.W.2d 465, 471 
(Iowa 1985). 
48 See NYSE Rules and Constitution, Rule 472(i) (2006); NASD Manual Conduct Rules, Rule 2110 
(2006); NASD Manual Conduct Rules, Rule IM-2310.2 (2006).  
49 NASD Manual Conduct Rules, Rule 2310 (2006); NYSE Rules and Constitution, Rule 405 (2006).  
50 NASD Manual Conduct Rules, Rule 2310 (2006).  
51 Churning (excessive trading done for the purpose of generating commission income) is an example 
of an unsuitable trading strategy.  See Arceneaux v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 767 F.2d 
1498, 1502 (11th Cir. 1985) (recognizing churning as a Rule 10b-5 violation where there is scienter).  
52 See Clark v. John Lamula Investors, Inc., 583 F.2d 594, 601 (2d Cir. 1978) (recognizing unsuitability 
claim as a Rule 10b-5 violation where there is scienter). 
53 The Content Outline is available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/series7.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 
2006) [hereinafter Content Outline]. 
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representatives, 54 identifies monitoring the customer’s account and making ongoing 
recommendations as one of the broker’s “critical functions and tasks.”55  In addition, 
industry standards recognize that a broker has a duty to warn if a customer is about 
to engage in investment activity that the broker deems excessively risky.  While the 
Content Outline does not specifically use the verb “warn,” several general 
descriptions fairly encompass this duty: “[a]ssist[ing] the customer in determining 
investment needs and objectives”56 and “[e]xplain[ing] how the risks and rewards of a 
particular investment or investment strategy relate to the customer’s financial needs 
and investment objectives.”57  Brokerage firms’ compliance manuals frequently state 
                                                 
54  The Series 7 examination is the entry-level examination for registered representatives.  It is 
developed, maintained and owned by the NYSE and is administered and scored by NASD.  It is 
intended “to safeguard the investing public by helping to ensure that registered representatives are 
competent to perform their jobs” and “seeks to measure accurately and reliably the degree to which 
each candidate possesses the knowledge, skills and abilities needed to perform the critical functions of 
a registered representative.”  Self-Regulatory Organizations; New York Stock Exchange, Inc.; Notice 
of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of a Proposed Rule Change and Amendment No. 1 Thereto 
Relating to Increasing Certain Fees Charged by the Exchange to its Members and Member 
Organizations, Rel. No. 34-53235, 2006 WL 1595655, at *2 (Feb. 6, 2006).  For background on the 
development of the Series 7 examination, see Self-Regulatory Organizations; National Association of 
Securities Dealers, Inc.; Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Proposed Rule 
Change Relating to Amendments to the Examination Specifications and Content Outline for the 
General Securities Registered Representative (Series 7) Examination, Rel. 34-35401, 60 F.R. 10886 
(Feb. 28, 1995).  
55 This is one of seven identified “critical functions.”  See Content Outline, supra note 53, at 3-4.  
Specifically, registered representatives must  
[1] Routinely review[ ] the customer’s account to ensure that investments continue 
to be suitable. 
[2] Suggest[ ] to the customer which securities to acquire, liquidate, hold, or hedge. 
[3] Explain[ ] how news about an issuer’s financial outlook may affect the 
performance of that issuer’s securities.  
[4] Determine[ ] which sources would best answer a customer’s questions 
concerning investments and use[] information from appropriate sources to provide 
the customer with relevant information. 
[5] Keep[ ] the customer informed about the customer’s investments. 
Id. at 3.   
56 This is an aspect of the critical function of “[e]valuates customers in terms of financial needs, 
current holdings, and available investment capital, and helps them identify their investment 
objectives.”  Id. 
57 This is an aspect of the critical function of “[p]rovides customers and prospective customers with 
information on investments and makes suitable recommendations.”  Id.  The language quoted in the 
text is not limited to investments or strategies recommended by the broker.  Id. 
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that warning customers of risks they may not adequately understand is part of 
brokers’ responsibilities to their customers.58  A well-known study guide for the 
Series 7 examination states that “[o]ccasionally, a customer asks a registered rep to 
enter a trade that the rep believes is unsuitable. It is the rep's responsibility to explain 
why the trade might not be appropriate for the customer.”59 
To recap:  (1) Tort and agency principles establish that agents can be held 
liable for failure to live up to established industry standards of care and competence; 
and (2) SRO rules and other industry standards relating to advice-giving are well-
established.  Thus, it would seem a foregone conclusion that courts would impose 
negligence-based liability on brokers when their failure to adhere to these standards 
results in financial harm to their customers.  As this Article will demonstrate, 
however, courts have been reluctant to impose negligence-based liability on brokers.      
C. Judicial Decisions 
Courts generally recognize that customers may sue their brokers for negligent 
misrepresentations,60 although some courts have cabined the theory with limiting 
doctrines.  Courts have not allowed negligent misrepresentations claims against 
brokers where “sophisticated equals” negotiated at arms-length61 or where the broker 
was acting as the agent for the seller of the investment product.62  These limitations 
illustrate a general disinclination to impose liability for negligent misrepresentations 
unless the court believes that the defendant owed a special responsibility to the 
                                                 
58 See Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Economic Suicide:  The Collision of Ethics and Risk in Securities Law, 64 
U. PITT. L. REV. 483, 501-02 (2003) [hereinafter Black & Gross].  
59 Id. (quoting PASSTRAK SERIES 7: GENERAL SECURITIES REPRESENTATIVES 670 (11th ed. 2000)). 
60  See, e.g., Zurad v. Lehman Bros., 757 F.2d 129, 134 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that broker violated 
duty of reasonable care in obtaining and relaying information when he advised customer to purchase 
securities without supplying information about the stock’s volatility); Cont’l Leavitt Commc’ns, Ltd. v. 
PaineWebber, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 1266, 1270 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (noting that defendant held itself out as 
providing information and advice to customers); Ebrahimi v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 794 P.2d 1015, 
1016-17 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) (discussing the statute of limitations for negligent misrepresentation 
claims).   
61 See Stephenson v. Deutsche Bank, 282 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1061 (D. Minn. 2003); see also Crigger v. 
Fahnestock & Co., 443 F.3d 230, 233 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding no fraud liability where the customers 
were sophisticated). 
62 See Zahorik v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., Inc., 664 F. Supp. 309, 314 (N.D. Ill. 1987).  
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person to whom he was communicating the information.63  New York courts, for 
example, require this “special relationship” because otherwise liability would attach 
to “casual response[s] given informally” in commercial relationships that do not 
warrant justifiable reliance.64  Thus, liability will be imposed only on those persons 
who possess unique or specialized expertise or who are in a special position of 
confidence or trust with the injured party.65  
Even under the restrictive view, the customer-broker relationship establishes 
the requisite “special relationship” since the broker solicits the customer’s business 
on the basis of the broker’s expertise and the customer seeks the broker’s advice for 
precisely that reason.66  Indeed, in providing advice and information, the broker 
fosters a non-adversarial relationship with his customers for the very purpose of 
encouraging the customer’s reliance on his expertise and use of his services.  Thus, 
the broker should not be encouraged to make the kind of casual uninformed 
responses that may be countenanced from used car salesmen.  There is some case 
support for this view; for example, New York, a state that is not generally receptive 
to customers’ claims, has recognized that a special relationship is present when a 
broker-dealer provides information about securities to its customers when soliciting 
their business.67   
In contrast to real estate brokers,68 courts are reluctant to impose negligence 
liability on securities brokers for failure to adhere to industry standards.  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court, for example, held that state regulations requiring brokers 
to have reasonable grounds for making recommendations to customers did not 
                                                 
63 See 2 DOBBS, supra note 42, § 472, at 1349; 2 FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES, JR. & OSCAR S. 
GRAY, HARPER, JAMES, AND GRAY ON TORTS § 7.6 at 476-77 (2006).  
64 See Kimmell v. Schaefer, 675 N.E.2d 450, 454 (N.Y. 1996) (quoting Heard v. City of New York, 623 
N.E.2d 541, 546 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1993)).  
65 Id.  Expertise alone, however, may not be enough.  See Mechigian v. Art Capital Corp., 612 F. Supp. 
1421, 1431 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (expressing unwillingness to hold that “in every case wherein someone 
with expertise is hired a fiduciary relationship is created”). 
66 See 2 DOBBS, supra note 42, § 469, at 1350. 
67 See In re Sterling Foster & Co., Inc., 222 F. Supp. 2d 216, 284-85 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).    
68 See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
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provide a basis for a customer’s negligence claim.69  Similarly, courts have refused to 
hold a broker liable for failing to monitor the account unless the broker has 
discretion or otherwise controls the customer’s account.70  There is, however, some 
case law support for recognition of a duty to warn.   Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner 
& Smith, Inc.,71 frequently cited for the proposition that the broker owes the 
customer only a limited duty, acknowledges that a broker could have a “duty to 
inform the customer of the risks involved in purchasing or selling a particular 
security,”72 the extent of this duty depending on the customer’s experience and 
intelligence.  A few other cases extend this duty to warning about investment 
strategies, where there is a relationship between the broker and the unsophisticated 
customer that justifies the customer’s reliance on the broker’s supposed expertise.73   
Courts do not provide extensive analysis or compelling justifications for their 
reluctance to hold brokers responsible for their failure to meet industry standards.  
Courts frequently assert a narrow view of the duties that brokers owe their 
customers and, in particular, assert that brokers owe their customers no ongoing 
duty of care.74  Rather, courts view the broker’s duty as transaction-specific, limited 
to the execution of the customer’s orders in accordance with his instructions and 
completed upon execution.75  The only exceptions the courts recognize involve 
                                                 
69 Minneapolis Employees Ret. Fund v. Allison-Williams Co., 519 N.W.2d 176, 182 (Minn. 1994); see 
also Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270, 1291 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (declining 
to apply section 299A to a broker-dealer). 
70 See, e.g., De Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., 306 F.3d 1293, 1302 (2d Cir. 2002); 
Cooperativa de Ahorro y Credito Aguada v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 777 F. Supp. 153, 159 (D. P.R. 
1991), rev’d on other grounds, 993 F.2d 269 (1st Cir. 1993); Caravan Mobile Home Sales, Inc. v. Lehman 
Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 769 F.2d 561, 567 (9th Cir. 1985).  For further discussion of the cases, see 
Black & Gross, supra note 58, at 504-05. 
71 461 F. Supp. 951 (E.D. Mich. 1978). 
72 Id. at 953.  
73 See, e.g., Gochnauer v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 810 F.2d 1042, 1049-50 (11th Cir. 1987); 
Beckstrom v. Parnell, 730 So.2d 942, 948-52 (La. Ct. App. 1998). 
74 See, e.g., De Kwiatkowski, 306 F.3d at 1306.  In contrast, investment advisers are treated as having a 
fiduciary relationship with the investor.  See, e,g,, Capital Dist. Physician’s Health Plan v. O’Higgins, 
939 F. Supp. 992, 1001-1003 (N.D.N.Y. 1996). 
75 See Leib, 461 F. Supp. at 952-53. 
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situations where the broker has control over the account.76  Under this narrow view, 
even when the broker recommends the purchase of a particular security and the 
customer acts on the recommendation, the broker has no duty to advise the 
customer about developments that make it inadvisable for the customer to continue 
to hold the security.  The Minnesota Supreme Court’s opinion is a typical example, 
reciting this narrow view of the broker’s duty and then stating that brokers are not 
“guarantor[s] or insurer[s]” against customers’ losses.77   The latter statement is a non 
sequitur, since the customer is not asserting that the broker made any guarantee of 
results nor is he seeking recovery for unanticipated losses.  Rather, the customer 
seeks recovery for losses attributable to the broker’s negligence.  Some courts state 
that, to impose liability on the broker, there must be evidence that the broker made a 
commitment to observe the standards and that the customer relied on this 
commitment.78  This approach is exactly the opposite of the Restatement (Second) of 
Tort’s approach, which holds the broker to the industry standard unless the parties 
contract otherwise.79  Other courts have stated that internal firm rules are for the 
benefit of the firm;80 others are disinclined to impose liability on firms that have 
adopted higher standards.81  These courts apparently believe that when the broker 
fails to live up to these standards, the disappointed customer should  take those 
losses as a learning experience and find a better broker.   
 Judicial reluctance to hold brokers to well-established industry standards is 
inexplicable: since these standards are for the protection of investors, customers can 
reasonably expect their brokers to live up to them.  This judicial reluctance, however, 
is pervasive and longstanding; thus, the best solution is to amend the SEA to 
establish federal standards of competence and care and to provide expressly for a 
federal remedy.  Legislative consideration of this proposal would at least engender a 
                                                 
76 Most instances of control are created by contract, where the customer gives his broker discretionary 
power over the account, although courts sometimes recognize de facto control, as where the broker 
dominates a particularly vulnerable customer.  See Black & Gross, supra note 58, at 488.   
77 Minneapolis Employees Ret. Fund v. Allison-Williams Co., 519 N.W.2d 176, 182 (Minn. 1994). 
78 See, e.g., Hotmar v. Lowell H. Listrom & Co., Inc., 808 F.2d 1384, 1387 n.3 (10th Cir. 1987).  
79 See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. 
80 See, e.g., J.E. Hoetger & Co. v. Ascencio, 572 F. Supp. 814, 822 (E.D. Mich. 1983). 
81 See, e.g., De Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., 306 F.3d 1293, 1311 (2d Cir. 2002); J.E. 
Hoetger, 572 F. Supp. at 822. 
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robust public debate over what customers can reasonably expect from their brokers.  
Part II sets forth proposed federal standards.  
II.  AMENDING THE SEA TO ESTABLISH FEDERAL STANDARDS OF 
COMPETENCE AND CARE AND A FEDERAL REMEDY 
This Article proposes that federal standards include four minimum standards 
of care that brokers owe to all their customers.  These proposed standards are based 
on SRO rules, industry standards, and common law tort and agency principles.  They 
may be stated as follows: (1) the broker must obey the customer’s instructions and 
must not make decisions pertaining to the account unless authorized by the 
customer to do so;82 (2) when executing transactions on behalf of a customer, the 
broker must obtain the best available price (the “duty of best execution”);83 (3) when 
communicating information about an investment product or strategy to a customer, 
the broker must exercise care to ensure that the information is correct and that the 
broker conveys it accurately;84 and (4) when making recommendations (or purchases 
in a discretionary account), the broker must have sufficient information about both 
the customer’s financial situation, including current holdings and investment 
objectives, and the recommended (or purchased) investment product, to ensure that 
the recommendations (or purchases) are suitable for the customer (the “suitability 
obligation”).  This suitability obligation also extends to trading strategies.85  Because 
these four standards are minimum standards that apply to all customer-broker 
relationships, the broker should not be able to disclaim his responsibility to adhere to 
these standards.   
 Two additional standards should be applicable when the customer relies on 
the broker to provide financial advice.  These duties, based on well-recognized 
industry standards, may be stated as follows: (5) the broker has a duty to monitor the 
customer’s account and to make ongoing recommendations about the customer’s 
portfolio based on changes in the portfolio, the market, or the customer’s financial 
situation;86 and (6) the broker owes a duty to warn the customer when securities or 
                                                 
82 Brokers, as agents, must obey the customer’s instructions.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
AGENCY § 385 (1958).  
83 See Newton v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 135 F.3d 266, 269-70 (3d Cir. 1998). 
84 See supra notes 41-43, 48 and accompanying text. 
85 See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text. 
86 See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text. 
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strategies the customer decides on his own to pursue entail greater risks than he 
should assume.87  Many customers make their own investment decisions and select 
their brokers for reasons unrelated to the quality of the investment advice; thus, 
brokers and customers should have the freedom to agree that these two standards do 
not apply to their relationship.  Accordingly, the broker’s contract with the customer 
may explicitly state that the broker does not undertake any responsibilities to oversee 
the customer’s account.  Because it is important for customers to understand that 
they cannot expect such services from their brokers, this provision should be written 
in plain English, in bold-face type, and require a separate acknowledgement from the 
customer, such as initialing.  
Finally, customers of those securities firms that hold themselves out as 
financial advisors and heavily advertise their stock-picking prowess may reasonably 
expect their brokers to meet industry performance standards.  Brokers could be 
rated, just as mutual funds are, according to their performance relative to market 
benchmarks.  Under this view, selecting suitable investments is a minimum 
requirement; among a choice of suitable investments, some will outperform others.  
The brokerage firm or individual broker that promotes superior stock-picking 
abilities could be held to (7) a duty of professional competence, just as investment 
advisers are.88  Reluctance to propose this as a legally enforceable standard, however, 
stems from the lack of well-developed legal standards for determining professional 
competence for stockbrokers.  Moreover, there is a reasonable argument that the 
broker should not be liable to the customer so long as the recommended 
investments are suitable.  Whether the broker has constructed the optimal 
investment portfolio for the customer involves financial planning considerations that 
well may be inappropriate for determination by a judge or arbitration panel.  If the 
customer is dissatisfied with the performance of his portfolio, the best solution may 
be to find another broker.  Therefore, adoption of this standard may not be 
advisable.  However, in instances where brokers advertise their stock-picking 
prowess, judges and arbitrators may reasonably take this into consideration in 
determining the broker’s liability to the customer. 
                                                 
87 See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text. 
88 See Erlich v. First Nat’l Bank of Princeton, 505 A.2d 220, 234-35 (N.J. Super. 1984) (holding that a 
bank offering professional investment advisory services should be held to the standard of care for 
professional investment advisers); Alton v. Wyland, 595 N.E.2d 993, 996 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) 
(stating that one who holds himself out as an investment advisor is liable as such).  Some states, 
however, do not allow professional malpractice claims against financial advisers because they are not 
“professionals” under state licensing requirements.  See, e.g., Maliner v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., No. 04-
60237-CIV-ALTONAGA/Bandstra, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5985, at *24 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2005). 
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III.  A SECOND-BEST APPROACH 
While the best solution is amending the SEA as described above, it is unlikely 
that Congress would adopt such legislation.  The securities industry is sure to oppose 
it and to finance lobbying efforts against it.  Moreover, history shows that 
amendments to provide investors with additional remedies are rare.89  Accordingly, 
this Part argues that the SEC should promulgate rules establishing the previously 
described federal standards of competence and care for brokers.  Since there also 
needs to be a remedy for customers who suffer losses because of their brokers’ 
negligent violation of these standards, this article explores ways to accomplish this. 
A. SEC’s vs. SROs’ Authority 
The SEC has the authority to adopt federal standards of competence and 
care.  SEA section 15(b)(7) authorizes the SEC to establish standards of “training, 
experience, competence, and such other qualifications” as the SEC finds necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.90  In addition, the 
SEC has the authority, under SEA section 15(c)(2)(D), to regulate negligent conduct 
by brokers in the OTC market that harms investors.91  Under the latter authority, the 
SEC has defined fraud broadly92 to include misrepresentations made with reasonable 
grounds to believe they are untrue.93   
The SEC has generally preferred, however, to delegate the responsibility for 
establishing standards and regulating sales practices,94 including the creation and the 
administration of the qualifying examinations, to the SROs.95  Similarly, the SEC has 
                                                 
89 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
90 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(7) (2006).  
91 The provision gives the SEC the authority to adopt rules that “prescribe means reasonably designed 
to prevent” fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts.  15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(2)(D) (2006).  
92 Fraud includes “any act, practice or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud 
or deceit upon any person.”  17 C.F.R. § 240.15c1-2(a) (2006). 
93 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c1-2(b) (2006). 
94 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b7-1 (2006). 
95 See supra note 54. 
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adopted only a few rules regulating sales practices, and those it has adopted relate to 
abusive, not negligent, conduct 96        
Due to the national importance of industry standards, the SEC should no 
longer delegate the responsibility of promulgating these standards to the SROs or the 
industry.  Instead, as the agency entrusted with investor protection, the SEC should 
assume responsibility for establishing the proposed federal standards of competence 
and care.  Elevation of these principles to SEC rules should send a signal to the 
industry that the SEC treats brokers’ duties of competence and care seriously.  In 
addition, a SEC rule-making proposal would provide a salutary opportunity for 
debate about what customers can reasonably expect from their brokers and would 
reaffirm the importance of competent and careful brokers.  The SEC rules should 
explicitly state that investors are the intended beneficiaries of these standards.   
B. Enforcement of these Standards 
If the SEC promulgates these standards and states that investors are the 
intended beneficiaries, the next issue is how customers injured by their brokers’ 
failure to adhere to these standards could obtain redress.   
Virtually all customers’ claims against their brokers are arbitrated in SRO-
sponsored arbitration forums.  There is a debate about whether arbitrators must 
apply the law in deciding these claims.97  Traditionally, arbitration has been viewed as 
an equitable forum where arbitrators are not bound by strictures of legal doctrine;98 
                                                 
96 Rule 15c1-7 prohibits churning in discretionary accounts.  17 C.F.R. § 240.15c1-7 (2006).  Rules 
15g-1 through 15g-9 regulate sales practices for penny stocks.  17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15g-1 to g-9 (2006). 
97 See Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up As They Go Along: The Role of Law in Securities 
Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 995-98 (2002). 
98 The following frequently quoted language, attributed to Domke on Aristotle, captures the concept:  
“Equity is justice in that it goes beyond the written law.  And it is equitable to prefer arbitration to the 
law court, for the arbitrator keeps equity in view, whereas the judge looks only to the law, and the 
reason why arbitrators were appointed was that equity might prevail.”  SECURITIES INDUSTRY 
CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, THE ARBITRATOR’S MANUAL unnumbered preface page (May 2005), 
available at 
http://www.nasd.com/web/groups/med_arb/documents/mediation_arbitration/nasdw_009668.pdf 
[hereinafter ARBITRATOR’S MANUAL]. 
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however, this view may be changing as, increasingly, the SRO arbitration process is 
becoming a more formal and quasi-judicial process.99   
Currently, both NASD and the courts take a middle-of-the-road approach.  
Thus, NASD provides arbitrators the following guidance:   
Arbitrators are not strictly bound by case precedent or statutory law.  
Rather, they are guided in their analysis by the underlying policies of 
the law and are given wide latitude in their interpretation of legal 
concepts.  On the other hand, if an arbitrator manifestly disregards the law, an 
award may be vacated.100   
The Supreme Court announced the “manifest disregard” standard in Wilko v. Swan,101 
but has never explained when arbitrators’ deviation from the law becomes so great as 
to constitute “manifest disregard.”  Due to this lack of clarity, the federal appellate 
courts have adopted different versions of the standard.102  For purposes of this 
Article, it is sufficient to note that courts recognize limitations on the arbitrators’ 
powers to award damages to customers in the absence of a legal basis for the award.  
If Congress provided an explicit remedy, as proposed in Part II, arbitrators 
unquestionably would have the power to award damages to customers.  Under the 
second-best approach, there must be a source of law that arbitrators can look to in 
providing a remedy to customers for breach of the standards.  The following 
sections, therefore, address the likelihood that courts would recognize remedies, but 
it is important to keep in mind that these issues are likely to be resolved in 
arbitration.  Thus, investors’ attorneys must be able to marshal sufficient legal 
                                                 
99 The best example of this is a pending rule change by NASD Dispute Resolution to require 
arbitrators to provide reasons for awards upon the customers’ request.  Self-Regulatory Organizations; 
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change and 
Amendment Nos. 1 and 2 Thereto, to Provide Written Explanations in Arbitration Awards Upon the 
Request of Customers, or of Associated Persons in Industry Controversies, SEC Rel. 34-52009 (July 
11, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nasd/34-52009.pdf [hereinafter The Reasoned 
Awards Proposed Rule Change]. 
100 ARBITRATOR’S MANUAL, supra note 98, at 29 (emphasis added). 
101 346 U.S. 427 (1953).  Wilko’s holding that arbitration agreements were unenforceable with respect 
to SA claims was overruled in Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 
(1989), but the manifest disregard standard for vacatur survived.  Barbara Black, The Irony of Securities 
Arbitration Today:  Why do Brokerage Firms Need Judicial Protection?, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 415, 434 (2003). 
102 See id. at 434-38. 
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precedent to ensure that an award of damages based on breach of the standards 
would not be susceptible to vacatur on the ground it is in manifest disregard of either 
federal or state law.  There are three possible sources of law: SA section 17(a), SEA 
section 29(b), and state law.   
SA Section 17(a).103  As noted above,104 the current assumption among the 
federal appellate courts is that the Supreme Court would not imply a private cause of 
action under SA section 17(a).  Is there any possibility of revisiting this issue?  
Maldonado v. Dominguez105 illustrates the judicial reasoning.  The court began its 
analysis with Hochfelder106 and the Supreme Court’s concern that without a 
requirement of scienter, plaintiffs could use the implied Rule 10b-5 remedy to bypass 
the procedural obstacles of an express negligence remedy.107  It then generalized 
Hochfelder’s holding to require scienter for any implied cause of action under the 
securities laws if there is already an express remedy addressing much of the same 
conduct and benefiting the same parties.108  The court apparently did not attach any 
significance to the fact that, after Gustafson,109 there is no explicit remedy for negligent 
trading advice by brokers.   
Victims of negligent trading advice, therefore, can argue that the specific 
concern addressed in Hochfelder is not present.  Additionally, given the strong federal 
interest in protecting investors from incompetent and careless brokers, as expressed 
by the SEC in adopting these standards, the Court would imply a private cause of 
action under SA section 17(a).  Unfortunately, however, this argument distinguishing 
Hochfelder ultimately may not be convincing, since the absence of an express cause of 
action for negligent advice in trading transactions may be seen as strong evidence 
that Congress did not intend to provide a remedy for this type of broker misconduct.  
In this view, Congress, in 1933 and 1934, was primarily concerned about grosser 
                                                 
103 15 U.S.C. § 77q (2000). 
104 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
105 137 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1998). 
106 See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text. 
107 Maldonado, 137 F.3d at 7. 
108 Id.  
109 See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.  
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forms of broker misconduct, such as fraud and manipulation,110 and, in subsequent 
amendments, it remained focused on conduct that was bad, not just careless.111  
Unless the Supreme Court does an about-face and either determines that Gustafson 
was wrongly decided or moves away from its almost exclusive focus on legislative 
intent, it is unlikely to accept policy arguments for implying a cause of action under 
SA section 17(a). 
  SEA Section 29(b).  The most overlooked explicit remedy in federal securities 
laws is SEA section 29(b).112  It invalidates “every contract” made in violation of any 
SEA provision or any of its rules and regulations, and “every contract,” “the 
performance of which involves the violation of, or the continuation of any 
relationship or practice in violation of,” any SEA provision or any of its rules and 
regulations.113  In 1990, Congress expanded the section’s coverage to ensure that 
customers could void transactions if brokers solicited purchases of penny stocks in 
violation of the SEC’s penny stock cold calling rules, as well as other SEC rules.114  If 
the SEC adopted federal standards of competence and care, could a customer assert 
a claim for rescission and restitution115 under SEA section 29(b) if the broker, in the 
course of performing his contract with the customer, violates any of these 
provisions?   
                                                 
110 For a thorough examination of the Supreme Court’s view toward implying causes of action in 
1934, see Margaret V. Sachs, Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction for Implied Rule 10b-5 Actions: The Emperor Has 
No Clothes, 49 OHIO STATE L.J. 559, 571-76 (1988).  She concludes that particularly where the statute 
was viewed as comprehensive, courts viewed the express causes of action as exclusive.  Id. 
111 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
112 The first, and still the most comprehensive, scholarly examination of this provision is Samuel H. 
Gruenbaum & Marc I. Steinberg, Section 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: A Viable Remedy 
Awakened, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1979) [hereinafter Gruenbaum & Steinberg]. 
113 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (2000).  
114 The amendment “amends Section 29(b) . . . to make voidable securities contracts made in violation 
of the Commission’s penny stock cold calling rule and all other rules adopted pursuant to Section 
15(c)(2) . . . .”  H.R. REP. No. 101-617, at 7 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1408, 1435.  Section 
29(b) “gives customers the ability to protect themselves from abusive conduct in the securities 
markets by voiding trades that violate the securities laws and rules thereunder.”   H.R. REP. No. 101-
617, at 33 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1408, 1409.  
115 The remedy does not allow for consequential damages.  See Gruenbaum & Steinberg, supra note 
112, at 24-27. 
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There is a paucity of case law interpreting SEA section 29(b), much of it 
applying the provision narrowly because of a judicial belief that the remedy is 
draconian.116  Some courts hold that only unlawful contracts may be rescinded, not 
lawful contracts whose performance involves illegal conduct.117  Other courts draw a 
distinction between violations that are inseparable from contract performance and 
violations involving conduct that is collateral or tangential to the contract.118  These 
narrow interpretations, however, are contrary to the plain meaning of the statute, 
particularly after the 1990 amendments,119 and Congress’s precision in carving out 
explicit exceptions to its applicability.120  The Supreme Court has consistently stated 
that the plain meaning of the statute, as supplemented by the legislative history, 
should control in interpreting securities laws;121 policy considerations are relevant 
only in fleshing out the contours of the implied remedies.122  Accordingly, if the SEC 
adopts these federal standards, customers should be able to avail themselves of SEA 
section 29(b) and rescind trades with brokers for violations of these standards.  
                                                 
116 See, e.g., Occidental Life Ins. Co. of North Carolina v. Pat Ryan & Assocs., 496 F.2d 1255, 1263 
(4th Cir. 1974).    
117 See Komanoff v. Mabon, Nugent & Co., 884 F. Supp. 848, 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (refusing to allow 
rescission of trades made to churn the account); Zerman v. Jacobs, 510 F. Supp. 132, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 
1981), aff’d, 672 F.2d 901 (2d Cir. 1981).  
118 See GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 272 F.3d 189, 213-14 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that 
borrower could not rescind a lending agreement on the ground that the lender violated rule 10b-5 by 
its short sales of the borrower’s stock).  This distinction was followed in In re Mutual Funds Inv. Litig., 
384 F. Supp. 2d 873 (D. Md. 2005), where late trading and market-timing activities were not a basis to 
rescind investment advisory agreements under § 47(b) of the Investment Company Act, which is 
similar to § 29(b).  Id. at 882-83.  But see Beres v. Thomson McKinnon Sec., Inc., No. 85 CIV 6674, 
1989 WL 105967, at *10-12, *16 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 1989) (refusing to dismiss the section 29(b) claim 
where Rule 10b-5 violations were alleged). 
119 See supra notes 113-114 and accompanying text. 
120 Thus, Congress provided that a rescission claim could not be brought because of an alleged 
violation of any rule prescribed under section 15(c)(3) and gave the SEC the authority to designate 
rules adopted under section 15(c)(2) as not triggering rescission under this section. 
121 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976) (stating that “[t]he starting point in every 
case involving construction of a statute is the language itself” (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor 
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring))).  
122 “It is . . . proper that we consider . . . what may be described as policy considerations when we 
come to flesh out the portions of the law with respect to which neither the congressional enactment 
nor the administrative regulations offer conclusive guidance.”  Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 737. 
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Furthermore, an arbitration award providing this remedy should not be subject to 
vacatur for manifest disregard.  
State Law Claims.  As discussed above,123 although common law tort and 
agency principles support imposing liability on brokers for violations of industry 
standards, courts have been reluctant to recognize remedies for negligent brokerage 
conduct.124  After establishment of these proposed federal standards and the SEC’s 
clear statement that customers are the intended beneficiaries of these standards, 
arbitration panels should not be reluctant to impose liability on brokers for violations 
of these standards under common law tort and agency principles. 
Some may question whether this proposal is necessary since, whether or not 
there is judicial authority for it, arbitrators may, in fact, be awarding damages to 
customers even in the absence of fraud; further, at least to date, unsuccessful parties 
do not routinely attempt to vacate awards under the “manifest disregard” standard.125  
Thus, arbitrators may be arriving at the right results, even if not strictly 
countenanced by the law.  However, currently there is a movement to make the SRO 
arbitration forums more like courts.  NASD is rewriting its arbitration code for 
customers’ claims126 and is proposing new rules that transform securities arbitration 
into a more judicial process.127  The most significant step in this direction, if adopted, 
is the requirement that arbitrators give reasons for their award if the customer 
requests them.  If arbitrators provide reasons, the award is more susceptible to 
judicial scrutiny, since it is virtually impossible to demonstrate that there is manifest 
disregard of the law in the absence of an explanation.128  Indeed, while NASD stated 
                                                 
123 See supra notes 41-59 and accompanying text. 
124 See supra notes 60-81 and accompanying text.  
125 See supra notes 100-102 and accompanying text.  
126 Self-Regulatory Organizations; National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.; Notice of Filing of 
Proposed Rule Change and Amendments Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 Thereto to Amend NASD Arbitration 
Rules for Customer Disputes, SEC Rel. 34-51856 (June 15, 2005), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nasd/34-51855.pdf. 
127 See, e.g., Self-Regulatory Organizations; National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.; Notice of 
Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Provide for a 10-Day Notice Requirement Before a Party Issues a 
Subpoena to a Non-Party for Pre-Hearing Discovery; SEC Rel. 34-51981 (Oct. 25, 2006), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nasd/34-51981.pdf; The Reasoned Awards Proposed Rule Change, 
supra note 99.  
128 See Dawahare v. Spencer, 210 F.3d 666, 669 (6th Cir. 2000). 
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that the purpose of the amendment was to increase investors’ confidence in the 
process, it noted that the presence of a reasoned award increased the likelihood that 
a reviewing court might find grounds to vacate the award.129  In addition, brokerage 
firms increasingly are moving to dismiss investors’ claims and moving for summary 
judgment on the ground that there is no legal basis for the claim, and courts have 
upheld awards that dismiss customers’ claims on such legal grounds. 130  If the SRO 
arbitration forums are taking on more aspects of a judicial proceeding, it will become 
increasingly important that investors have an unassailable legal basis for their 
negligence claims. 
IV.  POLICY CONCERNS 
This Part examines whether there are policy concerns unique to federal 
securities laws that might explain judicial reluctance, even prior to Hochfelder and 
Gustafson, to impose liability on brokers for negligent conduct.  If there are valid 
concerns, Congress or the SEC should be wary of providing customers with a new 
federal remedy.  First, this Part will examine the Supreme Court opinions to 
determine the relevance of their articulated policy grounds in the customer-broker 
context.  Next, this Part will look at lower federal court opinions to assess other 
reasons given for the disinclination to hold brokers accountable for their negligence.   
The Supreme Court precedent provides limited guidance (1) because it 
focuses primarily on the plain meaning of the statute, as supplemented by legislative 
intent,131 and, (2) because only two of the Supreme Court’s federal securities opinions 
involve suits by a customer against his broker. 132   Nevertheless, even though 
Gustafson133 did not involve a customer-broker relationship, the majority opinion did 
                                                 
129 The Reasoned Award Proposed Rule Change, supra note 99, at 4. 
130 See, e.g., Sheldon v. Vermonty, 269 F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that arbitrators can 
dispose of legal issues on dispositive motions); Reinglass v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Inc., No. 
86407, 2006 WL 802751, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2006) (upholding arbitrators’ dismissal of 
arbitration claim because the investor failed to plead fraud with the specificity required by Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure). 
131 See supra notes 121-122 and accompanying text. 
132 Both these opinions relate to tangential issues.  Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 
299 (1985), deals with the in pari delicto defense.  Id. at 306.  Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. 
Dabit, 126 S. Ct. 1503 (2006) deals with preclusion under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards 
Act.  Id. at 1514.  The paucity of case law is attributable, in large part, to Shearson/American Express, Inc. 
v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).  See supra note 14.   
133 Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995). 
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address policy reasons for restricting the applicability of private remedies that relate 
directly to customer-broker suits.  First, the Court alluded to the dangers of 
“extensive liability for every casual communication between buyer and seller in the 
secondary market.  It is often difficult, if not altogether impractical, for those 
engaged in casual communications not to omit some fact that would, if included, 
qualify the accuracy of a statement.”134  This concern echoes that of state courts that 
impose liability for negligent misrepresentations only if a “special relationship” exists; 
such a relationship is present when a customer has a relationship of trust and 
confidence with his broker so that reliance on his statements is warranted.135  More 
fundamentally, however, the reason to impose liability on brokers for negligent 
misrepresentations is to curb any tendency brokers may have to treat their 
responsibilities to convey information and recommendations casually.  If this results 
in brokers providing less casual advice to their customers, such an effect could be 
positive and may lead investors to seek better, more informed advice.  Second, in 
interpreting SA section 12(a)(2), the Gustafson majority found it worrisome that 
liability could be imposed without a showing that plaintiff relied on the negligent 
misstatement.136  To establish liability under the proposed standards, however, the 
customer would have the traditional burden of establishing reasonable reliance.  A 
related concern expressed by the Court in both Blue Chip Stamps and Hochfelder—the 
dangers of expanding the class of plaintiffs to include those who were not in privity 
with the maker of the statements137—is also not present in customer-broker cases.   
Customer-broker relationships are agency relationships, and, in another line 
of cases, the Supreme Court has expressed a desire to limit the scope of Rule 10b-5 
claims so that they do not intrude into areas more appropriately regulated under state 
law.  In the Court’s view, some purported Rule 10b-5 claims, properly viewed, do 
not raise federal securities disclosure issues.  Rather, these claims are transparent 
attempts to convert state law mismanagement or breach of fiduciary duty claims into 
                                                 
134 Id. at 578.  Indeed, this concern relates more directly to the customer-broker situation than it does 
to the facts in Gustafson, which involved alleged misrepresentations contained in the contract 
negotiated between the controlling shareholder and the purchaser of its shares.  Id. at 564.  
135 See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text. 
136 Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 578. 
137 The following language is found in both opinions:  “[W]e are not the first court to express concern 
that the inexorable broadening of the class of plaintiff who may sue in this area of law will ultimately 
result in more harm than good.”  Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976); Blue Chip 
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 747-48 (1975).  
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federal claims that are “‘at best a subsidiary purpose’ of the federal legislation.”138  
Amending the SEA to create a federal remedy for negligent broker conduct, 
however, is consistent with an important purpose of the federal securities laws from 
their inception—to improve professional standards of broker-dealers.139   While 
creation of this federal remedy would, to some extent, overlap with state law, it 
would not interfere with state regulation.  In light of increased investor participation 
in the securities markets and greater recognition of the importance of individuals 
investing for their retirement, the participation of the federal courts in interpreting 
and applying federal standards of competence and care would serve a vital national 
interest. 
Another concern expressed by the Supreme Court is the increased cost of 
doing business resulting from vexatious litigation.  More specifically, the Court is 
concerned about the effects of class action suits where the plaintiffs have purchased 
or sold securities during a period when material misrepresentations allegedly 
distorted the stock price. 140  In class actions, the stakes of individual plaintiffs are 
small, and the driving force may be the lure of lucrative fees for plaintiffs’ attorneys; 
hence, there is some reason for the Court to be skeptical of both the compensatory 
benefit to investors and the deterrence value of the litigation.141  However, the 
Court’s general fear of strike suits has no relevance when the real party in interest is 
the customer who is seeking compensation for losses suffered through the broker’s 
negligence.  In addition, the Court’s concern for protecting professionals who have a 
peripheral role in the plaintiffs’ loss142 is not relevant here.   
It is true, more generally, that imposing liability on brokers for negligence 
will increase the costs of doing business on an already highly regulated industry.  
Since the large publicly-traded brokerage firms consistently report large profits,143 
                                                 
138 Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478 (1977). 
139 See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text.  
140 Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 188-89 (1994); 
Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 740.  
141 The latter was the principal reason the Supreme Court initially implied causes of action in federal 
securities laws.  See J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964). 
142 Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 188-189. 
143  See Susanne Craig, Bear Stearns Profit Surges 81%, Driven by Bond and Stock Trading, WALL ST. J., June 
16, 2006, at C3; Randall Smith, Morgan Stanley, Mack See Net Soar, WALL ST. J., June 22, 2006, at C4; 
Press Release, Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., Merrill Lynch Reports Highest-Ever Net Revenues of $8.0 
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requiring them to invest more money in better training and supervision of their 
brokers would not be an excessive hardship, especially given the anticipated benefits 
to investors.  To the extent that federal standards may drive out of the industry firms 
with fewer resources to devote to training and supervision, this is not an undesirable 
result.  Moreover, there is reason to doubt that self-regulation gives investors 
adequate protection.  Unfortunately, recent history provides numerous instances of 
both the SEC and the SROs’ inability to protect investors even from outright fraud 
and other serious abuses of investor confidence.144  In addition, self-regulation is 
certain to change as a result of both the NYSE and NASD becoming publicly 
owned, for-profit corporations.  Thoughtful commentators have expressed concerns 
about whether enforcement of the SRO rules will be a priority in this environment.145      
Furthermore, the valid concern expressed about non-frivolous Rule 10b-5 
litigation—that former shareholders of the issuer will recover at the expense of 
current shareholders146—is not present in customer/broker cases, unless we extend 
the “robbing Peter to pay Paul” concern to apply to shareholders of a brokerage 
firm, who presumably understand the risks of the company’s business when they 
make their investment.147  To the extent factoring in the financial impact on firms’ 
accounting for their investors’ losses is a valid concern, it may be alleviated if 
                                                                                                                                     
Billion for First Quarter 2006, Up 28 Percent (Apr. 18, 2006), available at 
http://www.ml.com/index.asp?id=7695_7696_8149_63464_65577_65830.  
144 See generally One Broker Gone Bad: Punishing the Criminal, Making Victims Whole: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 107th Cong. (2002) 
(chronicling the massive fraud conducted by Frank Gruttadauria, a broker employed by three 
securities firms  over the course of 15 years, during which he stole at least $40 million of customers’ 
funds before turning himself in), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/107-
71.pdf. 
145 See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, Turning Seats into Shares: Causes and Implications of Demutualization of Stock 
and Futures Exchanges, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 367, 424 (2002); Edmund W. Kitch, Hard Thinking About 
Inevitable Developments?, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 37, 44 (2000). 
146 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 262-63 (1988) (White, J., dissenting).  There has been 
much scholarly commentary on the problem of damages in securities class actions.  See, e.g., JAMES D. 
COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES REGULATION CASES AND 
MATERIALS 727-28 (5th ed. 2006). 
147 The SEC recently formulated a policy on corporate penalties in response to similar concerns.  See 
Press Release, U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
Concerning Financial Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-
4.htm. 
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Congress enacts federal standards in the current climate, when the nation is now 
sufficiently far removed from the recent market debacle that constructive and 
dispassionate debate can result in a consensus regarding appropriate standards.  
Lower federal courts have expressed other policy reasons against customers’ 
suits against negligent brokers.  Even prior to the Supreme Court era that cut back 
on federal jurisdiction, the Second Circuit expressed hostility toward “saddl[ing]” the 
federal courts with “garden-variety customer-broker suits.”148  It is unclear whether 
this statement reflects merely a concern for docket control or whether it signifies a 
more substantive view that these issues are better left to state law.  The nearly 
universal presence of arbitration agreements in broker-customer contracts today 
cures the first objection, and the importance of individual investors in today’s society 
makes the customer-broker relationship a federal concern.     
Other courts believed that it would be unfair to subject a broker who acted 
in good faith to judicial review of his market judgment.149  However, in determining 
whether the broker satisfied his duty under the first six standards set forth above, the 
issue is whether he lived up to his duty of care, a familiar judicial inquiry under tort 
law.  A broker’s market judgment would be an issue for judicial review under the 
seventh standard, and because of the paucity of judicial precedents on this issue, this 
Article does not advocate for its adoption.  However, it should be noted that 
assessing the soundness of market judgment is a question that securities arbitration is 
uniquely qualified to perform.  In arbitration, there is no jury that might be prone 
toward undue sympathy for the customer or hostility toward the brokerage firm. and, 
on a typical three-person arbitration panel, one of the arbitrators is an industry 
arbitrator for the purpose of bringing industry expertise to bear on appropriate 
professional standards.    
Finally, another category of objections focuses on the plaintiff-customer and 
finds him insufficiently worthy.  Concern is expressed that greedy customers who 
were willing to gamble may now be trying to blackmail the firm into paying for losses 
the customers willingly incurred.150  These are valid concerns, but they are not unique 
                                                 
148 Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 183 (2d Cir. 1966). 
149 See e.g., Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 431 (N.D. Cal. 1968), rev’d on other grounds, 
430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).  
150 This sentiment is not new.  In the debate on the SEA, one Congressman stated:  “I also recognize 
another man who is very largely responsible for the misfortunes of the country and the excessive 
stock speculation and debacle.  That is Mr. American Citizen who wants to get something for 
nothing.” 78 CONG. REC. 7861, 7862 (1934) (statement of Rep. Lea), reprinted in 1 FEDERAL 
SECURITIES LAWS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1933-1982, at 853 (1983); see also Robert H. Mundheim, 
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to these tort claims.  Contributory negligence, justifiable reliance and similar defenses 
are available to minimize or, in appropriate cases, eliminate recovery altogether.  
Arbitration, with its emphasis on the facts of each particular case, is an especially 
good forum to resolve these disputes.  While arbitration is sometimes derided for its 
“splitting the baby” approach, such a compromise is appropriate when contributory 
negligence issues are significant. 
CONCLUSION 
Since 1934, Congress has amended the SEA on several occasions to improve 
professionalism in the selling of securities.  What is missing, however, is a federal 
remedy for investors to hold their brokers accountable for negligent conduct in 
trading transactions, particularly negligent advice-giving.  It is now time that 
Congress adopts federal standards of competence and care and provides customers 
with a remedy that will allow recovery for the financial harm caused by incompetent 
or careless brokers.  Toward that end, this Article proposes a number of federal 
standards of care and competence for consideration.  Legislative consideration of 
this proposal should, at the least, engender a robust public debate over what 
customers can reasonably expect from their brokers that hopefully will lead to a 
remedy to vindicate their rights. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
Professional Responsibilities of Broker-Dealers: The Suitability Doctrine, 1965 DUKE L.J. 445, 463-64 (1965) 
(discussing concerns that imposing civil liability for violations of industry standards “would be an 
invitation for disappointed customers to blackmail their broker-dealers”). 
